Propaganda of the Deed

Recently I was asked how our public diplomacy efforts are going over here... My answer was mixed.

Surely our knowledge and intel regarding Afghanistan and its culture was and is not completely ignorant - we were here in the 1980s helping the Muj fight the brutal Soviets, which required extremely sensitive dealings with locals on the ground level. This couldn't have been done without some working knowledge of the people, politics, and culture. Additionally, even with our limited ground force and use of massive air power utilized in the 2001 invasion and rapid toppling of the Taliban, we had to be aware of the significant players here and what they were capable of, which we did. To be fair, we certainly weren't experts, our regional/cultural knowledge and language resources were severely limited - yes our intial forces were relying on century-old British ethnography studies, our impatience with the establishment of working, modern, democratic institutions was misguided, and our attention span to secure the endgame here was unfortunately diverted to Iraq. Fortunately, we now are improving on these fronts.

Where we thought the Iraqis would greet us with welcome arms, falling over themselves to throw roses at our feet and the treads of our tanks, we found that was not the case. But initially, when we brought down the Taliban, the Afghan people couldn't have been happier to have us there, seeing us as a new sign of hope and the potentiality to bring them out of the destitution that 30+ years of war could do to a country. Sadly, the problems sited above, particularly our short attention span and lack of interest in fully engaging to secure the political victory squandered the small but very real opportunity we had to win the hearts and minds of many Afghans. We quickly reinforced suspicions that we would abandon them, as we had after the defeat of the Soviets in 89. As Senator Charlie Wilson said, "We changed the world, we did these great things... and then we fucked up the endgame". And as we reallocated our resources for the invasion of Iraq, we did the exact same thing again.

Over the last few years reconstruction efforts and the building of institutions have made progress, but nowhere near where they should be after 8 years. Reconstruction has been hampered by lack of coordination between NATO countries responsible for individual provinces and piecemeal projects. Institution building has been bogged down by incesant corruption. Security has decreased not only because of failed poppy eradication programs, but also because of insufficient troops and a reliance on local intelligence for airstrikes that were often misguided because this local intel was less interested in defeating the Taliban and more interested in executing tribal and familial blood fueds...

When it comes to public diplomacy efforts before the recent surge of troops and retooling of our strategy here, a number of operational issues were inimical to our message. As forms of action, they far outwieghed any propaganda of the word:

The first was lack of manpower and capability. This is relatively self-explanatory and is indicative not only of our shortcomings in public diplomacy, but our overall mission goals as a whole. Even those who wanted to support us couldn't be garunteed the necessary security to do so. Like we so often do, unfortunately, we leave so many good friends out to dry. This not only eradicated likely allies, it also began turning momentum back in the Taliban's favor. This lack of resources and attention also reinforces the concern stated above that we were waging this war on the cheap and had no intention of remaining here for the long haul. Not only did this discourage would-be allies and supporters from believing in us, it also encouraged warlords to maintain their militias and weapons caches for the day when we left.

Second, related to the first, was the growing number of civilian casualties. Dubious motivations from local intelligence, the Talis deliberate use of local villagers as human shields, and our over-reliance on airpower all contributed to the increase of this tragic statistic. Even though we wanted to be perceived as a force for good, dedicated to reconstruction, we were nevertheless increasingly perceived as only a force for destruction. Many times we would send a note of sincere apology, even some money or supplies to the bereaving families and villagers, but this was perceived as miniscule in comparison to the losses they suffered. Even when we were trying to make good on our mistakes, I think we made matters worse, equating the death of innocent loved ones with a few thousand dollars and a pallet of supplies. We came off as distant and uncaring, even if we didn't intend to do so. Again, actions often speak much louder than words.

In addition, with civilian casualties mounting and the Talis use of human shields coupled with our lack of manpower and capabilities, we had no rapid response in place. Even without the incidents that gave easy propaganda points to the Taliban because of our obvious mistakes, the Talis and their supporters were able to capitalize on this momentum and spread lies that more of these incidents were happening than actually were. They realized this to be one of our biggest vulnerabilities, so inflating death tolls as well as creating incidents and blaming them on us, or even fabricating entire events became a useful tool to spoil any good will we were garnering. We've only recently begun to reconfigure our efforts on this front. Having the ability to respond rapidly to these pernicious lies will be key going forward.

Third is saying one thing and then doing another. There has been a disconnect between our message of good will towards the Afghan people and some of our forces carrying out search and seizures in towns and villages without any omage, let alone respect or request for permission, to the local elders and leaders. Aggressively kicking down doors and viewing everyone as an enemy does have its practical basis for a soldier, but it does not contribute to the overall strategic goals of building positive impressions. Also, to be fair, there were plenty of forces conducting humanitarian missions and building good relations with locals - schools, canals, and dams were built, toys and candy were handed out to children, other forms of funding and support were provided to village elders, but it was not across the board, had little publicity outside the places it took place and were all too often overshadowed by the more aggressive tactics of other forces and the mounting toll of civilian casualties. At best we looked confused, in reality we seemed hypocritical.

All in all, however, we haven't lost all support. While some Afghans have begun to reminisce about the days of the Taliban, if only for the stability they provided, despite so many other unsavory charateristics of their rule, many others would be happy to settle for the status quo ante, with all its shortcomings, as long as the Taliban and/or factional warlordism do not reemerge to wreak havoc once more. For these Afghans, a little bit of progress is far better than such digression.

I am very optimistic for the renewed attention and refocus of resources and strategy. Gen. McChrystal seems to have an excellent grasp of what needs to be done, NATO countries are contributing more troops and assistance for reconstruction efforts on a daily basis, Pakistan and the ISI are FINALLY getting serious about removing the safehavens along the eastern border, and Afghanistan's neighbors all seem to be recognizing they have a stake in the peace as well. Bottom line, security is paramount. Reconstruction efforts are going to remain spotty and insufficient unless security can be garunteed. Notable developments in this area is the new strategy of poppy eradication which will reward local farmers for growing alternative crops. It is not that so many Afghan farmers are keen to keep growing poppy, many are not too proud of it, but the money has been just too good. Finally, we are working on establishing the right incentives to make a significant impact in this regard. Another positive devlopment has been the troop surge giving us the ability to move in, secure and now maintain areas we have previously not been before. The recent operation in Helmund province by US and UK forces is the example I'm thinking of. Previously, we would go into an area but not hold and maintain our position because of the lack of troops. This is going to change and I think will begin to change the dynamic in the positive direction.

There are also other, more tactical considerations that warrant attention as well when discussing our public diplomacy and IO efforts here. Examples are the re-establishment of village elder authority and credibility, which has been eroded by the bullying of the Taliban as well as our own actions, but this issue and others will be saved for another post. For now, this post is intended to think strategically about our efforts to win hearts and minds here in Afghanistan and to keep mindful of the mistakes we've made in the past so as not to make them again. Too often our short-term memory and troop rotations cause us to forget what we have already done, which compels us to feel we have to reinvent the wheel over and over again. Hopefully, under new leadership and renewed commitment, this all can be avoided.

More than anything we can say, it will be Propaganda of the Deed that will win the day. Time will be the only metric to tell whether we are beginning to turn the tide and once again regain the momentum in a positive direction. Most importantly, any improvements will be based on our actions and not so much on our words, which, however, must nevertheless remain congruent.